



Evaluating Impact of WTG Control Strategies on the Structural Integrity of Support Structures using FMECA



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


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Use of AI to train surrogate models to enable multi-objective optimization of **wind farm control**

Set of toolboxes and case studies showcasing the functionality



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


Assisting clients from
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900+ wind experts

Offices in 26 countries

Technology agnostic consultant




Background



- Operators are focused on keeping their asset operational following a pre-determined inspection & maintenance schedule.
- Leading players are aiming to implement risk based inspection: planning more selective visits, using findings from remote monitoring and observations on site → **Reliability Centered Maintenance**.
- How should they change their approach in the context of wind farm control?

Research question in the context of wind farm control

What is the impact of wind farm control on the structural reliability of wind turbines?



Case study on the tower & foundation of Lillgrund offshore wind farm, located in Sweden, operational since 2007, featuring **gravity based foundations**

Jeppsson, Joakim, Larsen, Poul Erik, and Larsson, Aake. *Technical Description Lillgrund Wind Power Plant*. Sweden, 2008.

Approach

- Methodology:
 - (Semi-quantitative) Failure Modes, Effects, and Criticality Analysis (FMECA).
 - Workshop with 11 experts from consortium partners (DTU, CENER, TUM, EDF, Engie)
- Objective:
 - Identify means to monitor and improve operational reliability, reduce failure risks, and inform strategies for spare part management and risk-based inspections.
- What control strategies do we consider?
 - Baseline (normal power production)
 - Derating
 - Yaw steering (up to 30 degrees)

Structured approach to evaluating risk



- Break down our system (wind power plant) into subsystems and components
- Assign **functional descriptions** of each component
- Describe **failure modes**, the **failure cause** and **end effect**
- Evaluate **likelihood** and consequential probability in the **beta factor**
- Score the consequence of the end effect for **severity** across multiple types of impact (safety, production availability, environmental, intervention, spare part costs)
- All scores are given on a 3 tier scale (low – medium – high) with defined categories
- **Continuous improvement**: reassess scoring based on feedback from operations

How do we evaluate risk?


- Two parameter approach:
 - Risk = likelihood * consequence.
- Three parameter approach (IEC 60812:2018):
 - Risk Priority Number = likelihood * detectability * consequence
- Ramboll approach (Scheu et al 2019*)
 - Criticality Number = Likelihood * β factor * (Σ Severity)

Criticality level	Criticality number range
Low	5 – 43
Medium	44 – 90
High	91 – 135


* Scheu, M. N., Tremps, L., Smolka, U., Kolios, A., & Brennan, F. (2019). A systematic Failure Mode Effects and Criticality Analysis for offshore wind turbine systems towards integrated condition based maintenance strategies. *Ocean Engineering*, 176, 118-133.

Step 1: System Breakdown


The asset/sub-system under consideration is divided into systems and components.



Primary Structure Breakdown



- We don't expect deltas for secondary structure.
- Only deltas in **loading of primary structure**



Change in loading for control strategies



- Derating:
 - Damage equivalent loads **decrease**
- Wake steering
 - Damage equivalent loads **increase**
 - Different loading profile due to yaw offset

Example failure mode description



Failure mode: Aerodynamic force variations beyond design assumptions lead to increased dynamic loading on the tower. These repeated stress cycles accelerate fatigue crack initiation and propagation in critical tower locations.

Failure cause: Dynamic loading passed down from the rotor to the support structure

Likelihood


- Baseline: Possible
- Derating: Not Expected
- Wake steering: High

Beta Factor


- Baseline: Medium
- Derating: Low
- Wake steering: High

Results

Changes in distribution of likelihood




Changes in distribution of beta factor



Results

Changes in distribution of Criticality



$$\text{Criticality Number} = \text{Likelihood} * \beta_{\text{factor}} * \left(\sum \text{Severity} \right)$$

- We have applied FMECA to identify and evaluate **failure modes** that may be impacted by a **change in wind turbine control**
- Semi-quantitative scoring, based on experience of the participants and assumptions on the change in loading
- Focus on the differences in **likelihood** and **beta factor** to reflect different conditions.

Next steps

- Quantify the delta in DEL for Lillgrund and its effect on remaining lifetime and failure rates
- Evaluate failure modes for other components (e.g. blades, yaw bearing)

Thank you



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Want to discuss more? Please send me an e-mail at khermans@ramboll.com